We begin by admitting that we do not
have a definition for the word Truth. Yet we need to use the
word in our attempt to define it. Therefore, we have no choice
but to begin with an intuitive concept of Truth.
Let us begin by assuming that Truth
is the property of sentences whose meanings correspond with
“facts” out in the “real” world.
In
addition, we begin with the assumption that propositions have
one of only two states: either true or false, even though we
will later see that this is incorrect.
1. Truth Exists
It is self-defeating to deny the
existence of truth. If someone claims that “Truth does not
exist,” then we can counter by asking if the claim is True or
False. If the claim is False, then Truth Exists, and if the
claim is True, then Truth Exists.
2. Truth is Unchangeable
It is impossible for truth to
change. What is true today always has been and always will be
true. All true propositions are immutable truths. Pragmatic
views of truth that imply that what is true today may be false
tomorrow, are untenable. If truth changes, then pragmatism will
be untrue tomorrow, if indeed it could ever be true.
3. Truth is Eternal
By extension of its Unchangeable
nature, Truth must be Eternal. Even if every created thing
ceases to exist, Truth will continue to exist. But suppose
someone asks, “What if truth itself should someday perish?” Then
the truth that “Truth has perished” would still exist eternally.
Any denial of the eternity of truth turns out to be an
affirmation of its eternity.
4. Truth is Spiritual
The
existence of truth presupposes the existence of minds. Without a
mind, truth could not exist. The object of knowledge is a
meaningful thought which resides in one or more minds.
a. Truth is Not a function of
Matter.
The existence of truth is
incompatible with any materialistic view of man. Materialists
believe that all thinking and reasoning is merely the result of
the random motion of particles in the brain. But one set of
relative physical motions is not truer than another set.
Therefore, if there is no mind, there can be no truth; and if
there is no truth, materialism cannot be true.
Truth cannot be a function of the
position of material objects because if a thought was the result
of some physical motion in the brain, no two persons could have
the same thought. A physical motion is a fleeting event
different from every other motion. Two persons could not have
the same random motion, nor could one person have the same
random motion twice.
b. Truth is Not a function of Time.
If thoughts were the result of
physical motions in the brain, memory and communication would be impossible. We are able to recall the past because we have minds
and not because of the motion of particles in our brains. Thus, if one is able to think the same thought twice, truth must be independent of time.
c. Truth is Not a function of Space.
Truth is independent of Space as
well. Not only does truth defy time and matter; it defies space
as well. For communication to be possible between two or more
people, the identical truth must be in two or more minds at the
same time. If, in opposition, anyone wished to deny that an
immaterial idea can exist in two different minds at the same
time, his denial must be conceived to exist in his own mind
only; and since it has not registered in any other mind, it does
not occur to us to refute it!
5. Truth is Superior to the human
mind
By its very nature, truth cannot be
subjective and individualistic. Truth is immutable, but the
human mind is changeable. Even though beliefs vary from one
person to another, truth itself cannot change. Moreover, the
human mind does not stand in judgment of truth; but rather,
truth judges our reason.
While we sometimes judge other human
minds (as when we say, for example, that someone’s mind is not as keen as it should be), we do not judge truth.
If truth
and the human mind were equal, truth could not be eternal and immutable since the human mind is finite, mutable, and subject
to error.
Therefore, truth must transcend
human reason; truth must be superior to any individual human mind as well as to the sum total of human minds. From this it
follows that there must be a mind higher than the human mind in which truth resides.
6. Truth is God
We have seen that Truth exists, is
unchangeable, eternal, spiritual, and is superior to the human mind. But only God possesses these attributes. If we substitute
the word “God” for the word “Truth” in the list of attributes, we see that:
God Exists
God is Unchangeable
God is Eternal
God is Spiritual
God is not a function of Space, Time or Matter.
God is Superior to the human mind.
These attributes apply equally to
Truth and God, and only to Truth and God. Truth and God are two different titles that refer to one unique being.
Unlike any other divine attribute
such as love or justice, Truth and God are convertible: Truth is God. God is Truth. No created thing possesses the attributes of Truth or God. There can be no True propositions
about created entities, including numbers, geometric patterns or so called “laws” of science because they are all dependent on
Space, Time or Matter.
The only true propositions are about
the person who holds the office of God.
In other words, Knowing Truth is
Knowing God, that is, Knowing Truth is being indwelt by God.
Truth is Knowledge of God.
> Truth
has been defined.<
Truth is God.
Truth is God?
What could that possibly mean?
How are we to interpret such a potent proposition?
To interpret that sentence, we must understand the several different ways that the word IS is used.
The word IS has at least
Nine
different known meanings or uses.
1- The IS of Existence
e.g. “God is”, meaning “God Exists.” The word IS can be replaced by the word Exists, and the meaning of the sentence remains unchanged.
2- The IS of Predication
e.g. “Laura is Beautiful,” meaning that Beauty is an attribute, quality or characteristic of Laura. The function of predication is to identify individuals and attribute
properties to them. It is one of the primary properties of language.
3- The IS of Class-Inclusion
e.g. “Lisa is Married,” means that Lisa belongs to a Class of people who are Married.
4- The IS of Finding Oneself
e.g. “Mariam is in Armenia,” means that Mariam finds herself in a certain location.
5- The IS of Consequence
e.g. “Knowledge is Power," means that having knowledge leads one to have more power. The Consequence of having more knowledge than before is an increase in power. In other words, Knowledge Leads to Power.
Power is not an attribute of knowledge, nor does knowledge belong to a class of concepts called power, nor are knowledge and power identical.
6- The IS of a Metaphor
e.g. “Time is Money.”
A Metaphor asserts that one thing is something that it literally is not. The copula of the Metaphor is not what is meant here.
7- The IS of a Simile
e.g. “ She is as cute as a kitten.”
A Simile likens one thing to another.
The copula of the Simile is not what is meant here.
8- The IS of an Idiom
e.g. “It is a piece of cake.”
An idiom is a commonly used expression whose meaning does not relate to the literal meaning of its words. The copula of an Idiom is not what is meant here.
9- The IS of Identity
e.g. “Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens.”
In this sentence, we can replace the word
IS with the phrase is the same as. The meaning of the sentence is clearer if we say “Mark Twain is the same person as Samuel Clemens.” Since the Subject and the Identicate* are both names
for the same person, their transposition does not alter the meaning of the
sentence.
e.g. “Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.”
*I find it necessary to create this new word to differentiate Identication from
Predication.
-------------------
We must discern between the two known kinds of Identity: Identity of Proper Names and Identity
of Titles.
e.g. “Samuel Clemens” and “Mark Twain” are proper names which reference one unique person. But “Truth” and “God”
are Titles, and do not reference one unique person. Titles reference one unique office or post.
See the page on the Nature of Identity.
-------------------
We can now examine our definition of the word Truth.
When we say “Truth is God,” which of the nine meanings of IS, is the word is?
1-
“Truth is God” cannot mean Truth Exists. Replacing the word is with the word Exists does not make sense. This meaning of IS is not what we mean.
2-
“Truth is God” is Not a Predication about Truth. God is Not an attribute, quality or characteristic of Truth. This meaning of IS, is not what we mean.
3-
“Truth is God” does NOT mean that Truth belongs to a Class of things (or beings) called God. This meaning of IS, is not what we mean.
4-
“Truth is God” cannot mean that Truth Finds Itself at a certain location.
5-
“Truth is God” does NOT mean that the consequence of knowing truth leads one to become God.
6-
“Truth is God” cannot be understood as a Metaphor.
7-
“Truth is God” cannot be understood as a Simile.
8-
“Truth is God” cannot be understood as an Idiom.
9-
The only other choice we are left with is that “Truth
is God” means that Truth and God are IDENTITIES.
Truth and God are two different titles that reference the same office.
We can restate it as “Truth is another word for God” and we have done no
damage to the meaning of “Truth is God.” In addition, we can transpose the
subject and the identicate to “God is Truth” and we see that we still have a logical and meaningful sentence.
We have shown that the words Truth and God are two different titles that
refer to one unique being.
At the same time, we are bounded by this new identity. We cannot use the
word Truth as a property of sentences that do not refer to God.
True
propositions are solely about the person who occupies the office of God.
Knowing Truth is knowing God!
We often use the word truth and assume that we are certifying or validating a statement that we have made. It is very difficult to avoid this practice. But it is an error.
Truth is NOT the attribute of any proposition which makes any claims about any created entity.
Truth is a synonym for God.
Even the word synonym is misleading here, since it literally means “same name.” Because the word “God” is not a name but a Title, its
Syn-title cannot be a name but must be a
Title.
Many religions use the word “God” to refer to the one who created the universe, an omniscient, omnipotent being. But that does not tell us much.
We need to have the name of this God to be able to relate to him. By having only His Title, He becomes a more distant being than a person whose Name we know.
To refer to him as God is similar to referring to the President of a company whose name we do not know. We might be able to say a great deal about him because we see the results of his commands. “The president has given
everyone a day off” or “The president has hired a new staff.” But we can still be in the dark as to who this president is!
“Truth” is a Syn-title for God.
Truth is a Title of Office, just as God is a Title of office. It is not the
proper
name
of a person but a
Title.
***************
Must ALL the attributes of Title “A” be identical with ALL of
the attributes of its alleged Identicate: Title “B”, for Title
“A” to be considered to be the Identicate of Title “B”, and vice
versa? [8-27-22]
This question arises out of the fact that ALL of the attributes
of Truth are not identical with ALL of the attributes of God.
Truth has Six attributes:
1- Existence
2- Immutability
3- Eternality
4- Spirituality, i.e. not a function of space,
time and matter.
5- Above the human mind
6- Truth is God
Whereas our definition of “God”, in addition to having the
above Six attributes, has several other attributes that we
cannot directly ascribe to “Truth”, attributes which pertain to a
personal being:- glory,
blessedness, perfection; all-sufficient, incomprehensible,
everywhere present, almighty, knowing all things, most wise,
most holy, most just, most merciful and gracious,
long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, among
others; “A” and “B”, (i.e. Truth and God) can still be
Identicates:-
***************
…
‘x=y’ may be true, even though x has an attribute (for example,
that of necessarily being x) which y has not got. Thus the
morning star, though it is the evening star, has the attribute
of being necessarily the morning star, which the evening star
does not have. This… will be unpalatable to many, but I believe
it to be a paradox of intensionality that should be accepted on
a par with the paradoxes of infinity that we have now come to
accept (for example, that a totality may be equinumerous with a
proper part of itself)…. The paradoxes of the infinite are
paradoxical only because we normally think in terms of finite
classes; this paradox of intensionality is paradoxical only
because we normally think, with Leibniz, in extensional terms.
…
To show that two things― propositions or any other things―
really are two, nothing will suffice short of
mentioning something true of one of them that is not true of the
other.
A Theory of Attributes Based on
Modal Logic; Acta Philosophica Fennica (1963); p98
Cited in
Philosophical Essays; Richard Cartwright; 1987; p140, 147.
***************
“A” and “B” might not have the
exact same attributes, but as long as none of their attributes
contradict any of the attributes of the other, we can say that
“A” and “B” are Identicates. This is due to the fact that
“Truth” and “God” are Titles of office, and we do not have to
know every attribute of each Identicate Title to understand that
the two terms are referencing the ONE Office.
In addition, we
can ascribe several of God̛̛̓’s attributes, such as His omniscience,
omnipotence and omnipresence to two attributes that are in common between
Truth and God: Eternality and Mindedness. Only an eternal mind can be
omniscient. Only an eternal being can have omnipresence and omnipotence. So
we can conclude that Truth and God have several more attributes in common
than the 6 that leads us to conclude that Truth and God are Identicates.
On the other hand, for Identicates of Proper names which refer
to one unique entity, the attributes of “a” must be identical
with the attributes of “b”. Thus in “Samuel Clemens IS Mark
Twain” and “Mark Twain IS Samuel Clemens”, the number of
attributes of “Mark Twain” (even though innumerable) must be
Identical with the attributes of “Samuel Clemens”.
This does not mean that either Mark Twain or Samuel Clemens have
immutable attributes. Immutability belongs only to Truth and to God.
Augustine’s exposition of Truth
as given in his De Libero Book II, edited and reinterpreted; after the work of Ronald Nash in Faith & Reason, p161, and the work of Gordon Clark
in A Christian View of Men and Things, p. 318.
An Extensive Bibliography is available for download. It includes a simple rating system for
the over 5000 sources which have been examined that deal with the Nature of Truth and related
topics.
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Aquinas, Thomas >Truth, Vol. 1: Qs I - IX; 1954, 1994
Augustine, Aurelius > An Analysis of the Treatise On Free Will; Basic Writings of St Augustine; Oates, Whitney; ed.; 1948
Augustine, Aurelius > On Free Choice of the Will; 1964
Augustine, Aurelius > On Free Choice of the Will; Thomas Williams; tr.; 1993
Augustine, Aurelius > On Free Will- Augustine: Earlier Writings; John Burleigh; tr.; 1953
Augustine, Aurelius > On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace & Free Choice, & Other Writings; Peter King; tr.; 2010
Augustine, Aurelius > On the Free Will: Book II only; Selections from Medieval Philosophers; McKeon, R.; ed.; 1929
Augustine, Aurelius > St. Augustine on Free Will; Carroll Sparrow; tr. 1947
Augustine, Aurelius > The Free Choice of the Will; Francis Tourscher; tr. 1937
Augustine, Aurelius > The Free Choice of the Will; The Fathers of the Church: Saint Augustine; Vol. 59; Russell, 1968
Augustine, Aurelius > The Problem of Free Choice Pontifex; Dom Mark; Tr. 1955
Benacerraf, Paul > Mathematical Truth; Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings; Benacerraf, Paul; 2004
Benacerraf, Paul > What Mathematical Truth Could Not Be - I - Benacerraf and his Critics; Morton, A. & Stich, S. P.; 1996
Benacerraf, Paul > What Numbers Could Not Be; Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings; Benacerraf, Paul; 2004
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Brennan, Joseph Gerard > A Handbook of Logic; 1961
Brouwer, L. E. J. > Intuitionism and Formalism; Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings; Benacerraf, Paul; 2004
Bultmann, Rudolf > The Gospel of John; 1971, 1975
Clark, Gordon H. > Science and Truth; Trinity Review; 1981
Corazzon, Raul > Gottlob Frege on Being, Existence and Truth; formalontology.it; 2008
Corazzon, Raul > Truth, From the Greek Aletheia to the Latin Veritas; formalontology.it/aletheia.htm; 2008
Cox, Paul > What is Mathematics? Part 2; members.cox.net; [2008]
Creath, Richard > Benacerraf and Mathematical Truth; Philosophical Studies; 1980
Crump, D. M. > Truth; Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels; 1992
Dales, H. G.; Oliveri, G.; eds. > Truth in Mathematics; 1998
Davidson, Donald > The Structure and Content of Truth; Jrnl of Philosophy; 1990
Davies, David Richard > What is Truth?; London Quarterly & Holborn Review; 1948
Denton, William > Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem; 2009
Devlin, Keith > Kurt Gödel: Separating Truth from Proof in Mathematics; Science; 2002
Dickinson, Richard > How do we know God? A Conversation Between Barth & Aquinas; Jrnl of Bible & Religion; 1958
Doriani, Daniel > The Deity of Christ in the Synoptic Gospels; Jrnl of the Evangelical Theological Society; 1994
Efros, Israel > Review: Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption; Jewish Quarterly Review; 1936
Erdman, Jonathan > Truth in the Gospel of John; www.theosproject.blogspot.com; jul2006
Fallon, J. E. > Truth in the Bible; New Catholic Encyclopedia; [2004]
Feigl, Herbert; Brodbeck, M.; eds. > Readings in the Philosophy of Science; 1953
Feigl, Herbert; Sellars, W.; eds. > Readings in Philosophical Analysis; 1949
Godet, Frederic > Commentary on the Gospel of John- Vol I- Chs 1-5; 1886; Vol II- Chs 6-21; 1886
Goetz, Billy E. > The Usefulness of the Impossible; Our Mathematical Heritage; Schaaf, William L.; ed.; 1963,66
Grese, William C. > Corpus Hermeticum XIII and Early Christian Literature; 1979
Hahn, Hans > Empiricism, Logic, and Mathematics; 1980
Hahn, Hans > Logic, Mathematics and Knowledge of Nature (Kaal, tr.) Unified Science- Vienna Circle Monograph; 1987
Hahn, Hans > Logic, Mathematics and Knowledge of Nature (Pap, tr.) 20th C. Philos.: The Analytic Tradition; Morris; 1966
Hayes, Zachary; ed. > Works of St. Bonaventure; 2005
Hempel, Carl G. > Geometry and Empirical Science; Our Mathematical Heritage; Schaaf, William L.; ed.; 1963,66
Hempel, Carl G. > On The Nature of Mathematical Truth: Readings in Philos. Analysis; Feigl, H. & Sellars, W.; eds.; 1949
Hermes Trismegistus > The Corpus Hermetica; www.blackmask.com; 2001
Hersh, Reuben > What is Mathematics, Really?; 1999
Hunt, Dave > The Need for a Thorough Purging; berean call; nov1998
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Joad, C. E. M. > Modern Science and Religion; Proc. of the Aristotelian Society; 1930-31
Joad, C. E. M. > Physical Objects and Scientific Objects; Mind; 1931
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Lolli, Gabriele > Logical Completeness, Truth and Proofs; Truth in Mathematics; Dales H. G. & Oliveri, G.; eds.; 1998
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Packer, James I. > Knowing God; 1973
Pap, Arthur > Mathematics, Abstract Entities, and Modern Semantics; Scientific Monthly; 1957
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Robbins, John W. > Review: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge; Lakatos & Musgrave; eds.; Jrnl of Christian Reconstruction; 1976
Russell, Bertrand > The Philosophy of Logical Atomism; Logic and Knowledge; Bertrand Russell; 1988
Schaaf, William L.; ed. > Our Mathematical Heritage; 1963,66
Thorson, Walter R. > Legitimacy and Scope of “Naturalism” in Science (I) Perspectives on Science & Christian Faith; 2002
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Westcott, Brooke Foss > The Gospel According to St. John- Vol I- Chs 1-7; 1908; Vol II- Chs 8-21; 1908
White, Leslie > The Locus of Mathematical Reality: An Anthropological Footnote The World of Math; Newman, J. R.; ed.; 1956
Wiebe, Richard > Gödel’s Theorem (Part II); Math Jrnl; 1975
Williams, Daniel D. > Brunner and Barth on Philosophy; Jrnl of Religion; 1947
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Zwicky, F. > On the Principle of Flexibility of Scientific Truth; Philosophy of Science; 1943
